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Abstract
Fundraising campaigns advertised via mass media are common. To what extent such campaigns
a⁄ect charitable behavior is mostly unknown, however. Using giving and volunteering surveys
conducted biannually from 1988 to 1996, I investigate the e⁄ect of a national fundraising campaign,
"Give Five", on charitable giving and volunteering patterns. The widely advertised "Give Five"
campaign was aimed to encourage people to give ￿ve percent of their income and volunteer ￿ve
hours a week. After controlling for selection into being informed about the "Give Five", I ￿nd
that people who were informed about the campaign increased their weekly volunteering activity
on average by almost half an hour, but their giving behavior was not signi￿cantly a⁄ected. I
discuss the policy implications associated with this result and argue that although the "Give Five"
campaign did not achieve its goal, its economic impact was considerable.
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11 Introduction
Mass media is a widely used tool to promote charitable causes.1 Although it is almost a truism among
fundraisers that media exposure of charitable causes facilitates giving and volunteering,2 the causal
e⁄ect of media campaigns on charitable behavior is mostly unknown. This is the ￿rst paper which
investigates the e⁄ect of a national fundraising campaign that was advertised via mass media. Initiated
by the Independent Sector (IS)3, the "Give Five" campaign, hereafter the GFC, began in 1987 to
encourage people to volunteer ￿ve hours a week and give ￿ve percent of their income to charitable
organizations of their choice, including religious organizations. The campaign also encouraged people
to help a friend or neighbor in need. From 1987 to 1995, the GFC was advertised with the collaboration
of the Ad Council through a series of public service announcements on television and radio, billboard
displays, bus-side posters, and magazine and newspaper ads. Local charities were also supplied with
promotional materials and asked to support the campaign. The thin red "pie piece" used in "Give
Five" logo emphasize the amount of time and income that people are encouraged to contribute, with
the remaining majority of the circle indicating what people have left over.4 During the early stages
of the campaign, IS o¢ cials announced a substantial increase in giving and volunteering.5 However,
after eight years of promoting the GFC, the unchanging pattern in charitable behavior documented
by the household surveys of giving and volunteering led IS o¢ cials to conclude that American￿ s do
not and may never give ￿ve percent of their income and volunteer ￿ve hours a week. Hence, the IS
announced that it was phasing out the GFC in 1995. Burlingame (1997) states that instead of trying
to change donor behavior, IS launched a new campaign in 1995, using the slogan: "Thanks for all
you￿ ve given. Imagine what more could do". Although the IS stopped advertising the GFC via mass
1A possible reason that may explain the popularity of media campaigns among charities is that occasionally, some
charities are o⁄ered free radio airtime, billboard space, or other marketing opportunities. For example, in her Chronicle
of Philanthropy article "Why free advertising might not be a bargain?" (February 6, 2009), Brennen Jensen reports that
One Laptop Per Child, a charity in Cambridge, MA received as much as $15 million in free media exposure including
TV, print, and billboard.
2See, for example, Bray (2005).
3Founded in 1980, IS is a non-pro￿t organization with a main goal of promoting the development of strategies to
strengthen volunteering, voting, giving, and other forms of citizen engagement.
4A selection of "Give Five" advertisements are available at www.independentsector.org/give5/through_years.htm.
5In her New York Times article "No rise is found in volunteerism" (November 24, 1989), Kathleen Teltsch reports
that Virginia A. Hodgkinson, vice president for research for the IS, announced a substantial increase in giving and
volunteering due to the GFC. However, the article also mentions that in the Denver area, the ￿rst area to report on its
progress in the campaign, annual household donations to charitable causes increased from $715 in 1986 to $815 in 1988,
but the level of volunteering did not change signi￿cantly.
2media in 1995, it still continues to promote the campaign in its o¢ cial web site. The campaign￿ s goal
of having people donate ￿ve percent of their income and volunteer ￿ve hours a week is also widely
promoted by various charitable organizations as a guide for contributions.6
Recent studies have shown the positive e⁄ect of fundraising on charitable giving and volunteering.
For example, using panel data from the tax returns of charities, Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler
(1995) and Okten and Weisbrod (2000) show the positive e⁄ect of fundraising expenses on charitable
contributions. Using household level survey data, Schervish and Havens (1997) and Y￿r￿k (2009) ￿nd
a positive relationship between personal charitable solicitations and giving. Meer and Rosen (2009)
￿nd a similar result using data on alumni donations. The positive e⁄ect of personal solicitations on
volunteering is well-documented in the literature as well. Freeman (1997) and Y￿r￿k (2008) show that
being solicited by a charity is the most important reason for why people volunteer their time. Andreoni
and Payne (2003) suggest that these ￿ndings are due to the informative e⁄ect of fundraising. Media
is another important tool for charities to inform potential donors about the activities and services
they provide. Recent work documents how the informational e⁄ect of media changes the public￿ s
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior.7 However, the existing literature is silent on how media a⁄ects
charitable behavior.8
Part of this de￿ciency in the literature is due to lack of data on fundraising campaigns advertised
via mass media. In this paper, I use biannual household surveys of charitable giving and volunteering
conducted from 1988 to 1996, which contain a unique question on whether the respondent is informed
about the GFC, to estimate the e⁄ect of the GFC on charitable giving and volunteering patterns.
During the active campaign period, the number of people who heard about the GFC remained stable
but was relatively low. I hypothesize that people who are more charitably inclined may be more
likely to hear about the GFC. I use several empirical models based on propensity to score matching
estimators to control for the possible selection into being informed about the GFC.
Using conventional regression methods, which do not control for the selection problem, I document
that people who heard about the GFC signi￿cantly increased their giving as a percentage of their
6For example, Just Give organization promotes this goal in its website.
7See, for example, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Dyck and Zingales (2002), and Karlan, Gerber, and Bergan (2009).
8The exception is Brown and Minty (2008), who investigate the e⁄ect of the media coverage of the 2004 tsunami
on charitable donations to relief agencies. Furthermore, some recent studies use web based TV, internet, and radio as
experimental tools to understand the determinants of charitable behavior. See, for example, Fong and Luttmer (2009)
and Jen and Croson (2009).
3household income by around 0:4 percentage points and their weekly volunteering hours by half an
hour. However, the magnitude of the e⁄ect of the GFC on charitable giving decreases and becomes
insigni￿cant once the selection into being informed about the GFC is controlled for. Similarly, the
magnitude of the e⁄ect of the GFC on volunteering decreases once the selection is controlled for but
its e⁄ect remains mostly signi￿cant. After controlling for the selection into being informed about the
GFC, I ￿nd that people who heard about the campaign increased their weekly volunteering activity
on average by slightly less than half an hour. In general, this result is also robust to the selection
of regression methods, di⁄erent matching estimators, and control variables. Although my ￿ndings
imply that the GFC did not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on giving patterns, a rough estimate suggests
that the dollar value of an increase in volunteering due to the GFC during the campaign period was
at least $48 million a week. This result highlights the importance of media campaigns as a valuable
to tool to promote charitable causes and facilitate charitable behavior.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the econometric frame-
work. Section three presents the data and summary statistics. The results, robustness tests, and the
economic impact of the GFC are discussed in section four. Section ￿ve concludes with a summary of
results and suggestions for future research.
2 Empirical framework
Let Y1i;t and Y0i;t be the outcome for a random person i surveyed in year t in the two counterfactual
situations of treatment (Ti;t = 1) and non-treatment (Ti;t = 0), where the outcome is the amount
of money donated as a percentage of income or volunteering hours per week and the treatment
is whether person i is informed about the GFC. Hence, the outcome observed for individual i is
Yi;t = (1 ￿ Ti;t)Y0i;t + Ti;tY1i;t. The parameter that is of primary policy interest is the average
treatment e⁄ect of the GFC on the outcome variables, de￿ned as ATT = E(Y1i;t ￿ Y0i;tjTi;t = 1).
This is the e⁄ect of the campaign on those who actually heard about the GFC.
The GFC did not target a speci￿c group of people, hence I start with the assumption that exposure
to the GFC is random. The outcome variables are censored due to the large number of observations
for people who do not donate or do not volunteer. In order to account for the censored outcome, I
4estimate the following standard Tobit model:
Yi;t = max(0;￿
0
Xi;t + ￿Ti;t + ￿
0
Dt + "i;t) (1)
where Xi;t is the set observable characteristics of the respondent, Dt is a set of survey year dummies,
and "i;t is the well-behaved error term with zero mean and constant variance ￿. Year dummies in this
model capture aggregate factors during the campaign period that would cause changes in the outcome
variable such as potential variations in charitable behavior due to macroeconomic shocks or possible
changes in the content of the GFC advertising from one year to another.9 However, this model
assumes that the e⁄ect of the GFC on the outcome variables remains constant over time.10 Although
this model has the advantage of accounting for the censored outcome, it has the disadvantage of
imposing linear functional form and restrictions on the values of the treatment e⁄ects that are based
on the shape of the normal distribution.
People who are more charitably inclined may be more likely to pay attention to the news about
charitable organizations and fundraising campaigns, and hence, may be more likely to hear about the
GFC. In order to control for this possible selection problem, I use several propensity score matching
estimators. The main identifying assumption of matching estimators is that if one can observe enough
information on strictly exogenous variables that determine the probability of being informed about the
GFC, then giving and volunteering is mean independent of the treatment conditional on observable
covariates. In this case, the e⁄ect of treatment on the outcome variables can be consistently estimated.
Traditional matching estimators match each treatment unit to a ￿xed number of control units (those
who did not hear about the campaign). The application of these methods is impractical to implement
when the set of controls gets large and includes continuous variables. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983), I use a propensity score matching estimator to deal with the dimensionality problem. Let
P(Xi;t) be the propensity score, de￿ned as P(Xi;t) = Pr(Ti;t = 1jXi;t). Then, the ATT is rede￿ned
as
ATT = EfE[Y1i;tjTi;t = 1;P(Xi;t)] ￿ E[Y0i;tjTi;t = 0;P(Xi;t)]jTi;t = 1g. (2)
Formally, in order to derive equation (2), balancing and unconfoundedness properties should be
9Year dummies cannot control the potential changes in the content of the GFC advertising within the same year.
However, there is no evidence to suggest this was the case.
10In this paper, I focus on the average e⁄ect of the GFC on giving and volunteering patterns during the campaign
period. One can also estimate the e⁄ect of the GFC for di⁄erent years by interacting year dummies with the treatment
variable.
5satis￿ed.11 The balancing property states that for a given propensity score, exposure to treatment
is random, hence treated and control units should be on average identical in terms of observable
covariates. On the other hand, the unconfoundedness property guarantees that the treatment is
random conditional on the set of observable characteristics, which allows for selection on observables.
In principle, since the propensity score is a continuous variable, one cannot observe two units with
exactly the same value of P(Xi;t). Therefore, an estimate of the propensity score is not su¢ cient to
estimate equation (2). Following Dehejia and Wahba (2002), I use several propensity score matching
methods in order to overcome this problem, namely nearest neighborhood matching (NM) with and
without replacement, nearest four matching (NFM), radius matching (RM) with di⁄erent calipers,
and kernel matching (KM).
Rosenbaum (1995) argues that in NM without replacement, the results can be sensitive to the
order in which treatment units and control units are matched. I consider ￿ low-to-high￿matching, in
which the treatment units are ranked according to their propensity score in an ascending order. In
this method, the highest ranked treatment unit is ￿rst matched to a control unit then that particular
unit is removed from the matching algorithm.12 In NM with replacement however, the matching
algorithm minimizes the propensity score distance between the matched control units and reduces
bias since each treatment unit can be matched to the nearest control unit even if a control unit is
used several times. Given the estimated propensity score, NFM matches each treatment unit with the
four closest control units. RM sets a neighborhood in terms of a radius around the propensity score
of the treated observation and excludes matches that lie outside this prede￿ned neighborhood. In
order to test the robustness of results to the selection of neighborhood, I implement the RM estimator
with two di⁄erent calipers, 0:001 and 0:005. In KM, all treated units are matched with a weighted
average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between propensity
scores of treatment and control groups. In conducting the KM, I use an Epanechnikov kernel with a
bandwidth of 0:01.13 All of these methods are estimated non-parametrically and share the advantage
11I also assume that matching assumption is satis￿ed such that Pr(Ti;t= 1jP(Xi;t)) 2 (0;1). This assumption
ensures that for each value of the propensity score, there are both treated and untreated individuals.
12Alternatively, in high-to-low matching, the treatment units are ranked according to their propensity score in a de-
scending order. This method yields similar results compared with the low-to-high matching under di⁄erent speci￿cations.
The results are available from the author upon request.
13Black and Smith (2004) ￿nd that the Epanechnikov kernel estimator performs better than Gaussian kernel indepen-
dent of the bandwidth selected and the performance of the Kernel estimator is relatively independent of the selection of
bandwidth until one gets to very small bandwidths. I also try several bandwidths between 0.001 and 0.1. The results
6that they avoid functional form assumptions to estimate equation (2). However, they are reliable to
the extent that unobservables correlated with being informed about the GFC do not directly a⁄ect
the outcome variables.
3 Data
The propensity score matching analysis requires a large set of strictly exogenous control variables. I
use a rich data set of biannual household surveys conducted from 1988 to 1996 by the Gallup Orga-
nization, and commissioned by the IS. These ￿ve independent cross-sectional surveys were conducted
in person with one adult member of the household and provide one of the most comprehensive as-
sessments of giving and volunteering activity in the United States. Pooling the biannual data from
1988 to 1996 gives a nationally representative sample of 12;401 households.14 However, eliminating
observations missing key variables yields a sub-sample of 8;851 households for the empirical analysis.
The surveys record information on giving and volunteering for 12 di⁄erent functional categories
of charitable activity.15 For each household, I calculate the amount of charitable contributions as
the sum of money that the household has reported giving to each of these categories. Similarly, for
each respondent, the total hours of volunteering is calculated as the sum of time that the respondent
volunteered for each of the charitable activities. From 1987 to 1995, the average volunteering and
giving rates were 48 and 73 percent, respectively. On average, people donate 1:8 percent of their
income to charitable organizations, and volunteer 1:7 hours per week.16 Table 1 presents the summary
statistics and the de￿nitions of key variables used in the empirical analysis. Compared with those
who did not hear about the GFC, people who were informed about the campaign tend to have higher
household incomes. They also tend to be younger, employed, and well educated.
are comparable to my original estimate and available upon request.
14Each wave contains data for the prior year. The IS also collected data for 1999 and 2001. However, respondents
of these surveys were not asked questions about the GFC. Gallup Organization collected charitable giving data at the
household level but volunteering data at the individual level.
15These categories are health, education, religious, human services, environment, public bene￿t, recreation, art, youth
development, private community, international, and other unnamed organizations. Compared with the other editions,
the wording of the questions on giving and volunteering to di⁄erent areas of charitable activity is slightly di⁄erent in
the 1988 edition. For this particular survey year, I estimate total giving (volunteering) as the sum of money (time) that
the respondent has reported contributing to each of the speci￿c charity groups that she was asked about, excluding her
donations (volunteering hours) to political organizations. I also exclude informal and work-related contributions, and
contributions to friends, neighbors, relatives, and strangers.
16On average, donors donated 2.2 percent of their income and volunteers volunteered 3.5 hours per week.
7Since households are allowed to itemize charitable deductions on their personal income taxes,
each dollar given away costs less than a dollar if the household itemizes deductions. I compute the
price of giving as 1 ￿ t for those who itemize deductions and 1 for those who do not, where t is the
marginal tax rate that the donor faces. Since the survey does not report marginal tax rates, following
Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall (2003), I calculate this variable for each household using information
on itemization status, number of household members, gross income, probable ￿ling status, and the
tax schedules for the relevant year.17
The unique feature of the Gallup survey is that it contains a question on whether the respondent
is informed about the GFC. The question is worded "Have you heard about the national program,
Give Five, the goal being for people to become "￿vers" by contributing at least 5 percent of income to
charities and religious organizations and volunteering at least 5 hours per week?". Simple tabulations
of responses to this question reveals that on average 9 percent of the respondents have heard about the
campaign. In Table 2, I report that on average, those who were informed about the campaign donated
2:1 percent of their income and volunteered 2 hours per week, while those who were uninformed
donated 1:7 percent of their income and volunteered 1:6 hours per week. Hence, the raw numbers
suggest that the GFC increased household giving as a percentage of income by 0:3 percentage points
and weekly volunteering by around 60 ￿ 0:378 = 22:7 minutes. Furthermore, these e⁄ects were
statistically signi￿cant, There results are also similar within individual years. Figure 1 shows that
those who heard about the campaign always reported donating and volunteering more than those who
were uninformed about the campaign, except for 1987. In 1987, although the informed respondents
volunteered more than the uninformed respondents, they gave slightly less than those who did not
hear about the GFC. However, Table 2 also reports that the e⁄ect of the GFC on those who were
donors and volunteers during the campaign period was insigni￿cant. Hence, simple tabulations show
that the GFC was not e⁄ective in increasing the contribution amount and volunteering time of existing
donors but did a good job in generating new volunteers and converting non-donors to donors.
The 1990, 1992, and 1994 waves of the Gallup survey contain an additional question on how
the respondent learned about the GFC. Among those who were aware of the GFC, the most popular
answers were TV (61 percent), newspapers (18 percent), other sources (17 percent), radio (12 percent),
17Following Andreoni (2006), the price of volunteering can be calculated as w(1 ￿ t), where w is the wage rate of
the respondent. Since the information on wage rate is available only in 1992 and 1994 editions of the survey, I do not
use this information in the analysis.
8charitable organizations (12 percent), and magazines (9 percent). Moreover, in the 1992, 1994,
and 1996 waves of the survey, respondents who were informed about the GFC were also asked how
reasonable they think the GFC￿ s goal is. More than 62 percent of the respondents reported that the
goal of the GFC is very reasonable or somewhat reasonable.
4 Results
In this section, I ￿rst assume that the selection into the treatment (being informed about the GFC)
is random and estimate standard tobit models for comparison purposes. Next, I estimate several
models under di⁄erent speci￿cations to address the possible selection into being informed about the
GFC. These models rely on selection on observables, i.e., propensity score matching methods. As a
robustness check, I also discuss methods relying on selection on unobservables.
4.1 Baseline Tobit estimates
Under di⁄erent speci￿cations, I estimate equation (1) and present the marginal e⁄ects of control
variables conditional on the outcome being uncensored in Table 3. The ￿rst speci￿cation includes
traditional control variables and dummies controlling for the year e⁄ects. Since di⁄erent states may
have di⁄erent treatments for giving and volunteering, I control for the state e⁄ects in the second
speci￿cation. People who are integrated with their community may be more likely to donate and
volunteer. In order to address this possibility, the third speci￿cation includes community e⁄ects.
These are the dummies controlling for whether the respondent owns his or her home and the number
of years that the respondent lived in her current community. Fourth speci￿cation uses full set of
controls and includes both state e⁄ects and community e⁄ects simultaneously.18 In general, the
marginal e⁄ects of the control variables have the expected signs under all speci￿cations. Income,
educational attainment, and regular attendance to religious services are positively associated with
charitable behavior. whereas tax price has a negative a⁄ect on both giving and volunteering. The
18I also run two robustness tests in order to check the sensitivity of the Tobit models to the possible endogenity of
the tax price. First, I exclude the tax price of giving from the Tobit model and check whether the e⁄ect of the GFC is
sensitive to this alternative speci￿cation. Second, I instrument the tax price with the "￿rst dollar price", which is the
marginal tax rate that applies to the ￿rst dollar donated to charity, and re-estimate the Tobit models. The estimated
e⁄ect of the GFC remains similar in both models. The results from these alternative models are available from the
author upon request.
9signi￿cant marginal e⁄ects of the GFC in giving equations di⁄er between 0:21 and 0:23 percentage
points, implying that the GFC increased giving as a percent of household income for those who
actually donated money. Being informed about the campaign also positively a⁄ects volunteering.
Under di⁄erent speci￿cations, I ￿nd that the marginal e⁄ect of the GFC on volunteering is around
half an hour per week. In order to ￿nd the e⁄ect of the GFC on those who are actually informed
about the campaign, using the simple formula suggested by Angrist (2001), I calculate the ATT of
the GFC. The estimated ATT coe¢ cients imply that people who heard about the campaign increased
their giving as a percent of their household income by around 0:4 percentage points and their weekly
volunteering hours by approximately half an hour. Furthermore, the standard errors calculated by
the delta method suggest that these e⁄ects are signi￿cant at conventional signi￿cance levels.
As mentioned before, the 1990, 1992, and 1994 waves of the Gallup survey includes an additional
question on how the respondent learned about the GFC. Several respondents report that they were
informed about the campaign by multiple media sources. Hence, it is hard to distinguish the e⁄ect of
a particular media source from the rest. Yet, I estimate several tobit models to investigate whether
the source of information on the GFC, namely TV, radio, newspaper, or magazine, has any e⁄ect on
the giving and volunteering patterns of those who heard about the campaign. 19 Table 4 shows that
when it comes to charitable giving, how the respondent learned about the GFC does not matter. For
those who heard about the campaign, the e⁄ect of being informed about the GFC from a particular
media source on giving is not sign￿cantly di⁄erent from the e⁄ect of being informed about the GFC
from any other media source. A similar result also applies for the volunteering patterns of those who
heard about the GFC, except that the e⁄ect of being informed about the GFC from a newspaper or a
magazine ad on weekly volunteering hours is signi￿cantly di⁄erent than the e⁄ect of being informed
about the GFC from a TV commercial.20
19In these models, the dependent variables are giving as a percent of income and weekly volunteering hours for those
who heard about the GFC. Binary treatment variables are whether the respondent was informed about the GFC via
TV, radio, newspaper, or magazine. The rest of the control variables are the same as the ￿rst speci￿cation reported in
columns one and ￿ve of Table 3 for corresponding dependent variables.
20Although not reported, tobit estimates suggest that those who heard about the campaign from a newspaper or a
magazine volunteered slightly more compared with those who heard about the campaign via TV.
104.2 Propensity score matching estimates
In order to conduct propensity score matching, I ￿rst estimate the propensity score, a probit model
of the probability of being informed about the GFC as a function of observable characteristics. Table
5 shows the marginal e⁄ects of control variables on the probability of being informed about the GFC
under four di⁄erent speci￿cations.21 The ￿rst speci￿cation controls for household income, the tax
price of giving, age, family size, gender, educational attainment, race, ethnicity, employment and
marital status, regular attendance at religious services, and year e⁄ects. In addition to media, the
IS also used its local member charities in several states to promote the GFC.22 Hence, I consider
state e⁄ects in the second speci￿cation. As in the Tobit models, the third speci￿cation includes
community e⁄ects, whereas the fourth speci￿cation adds both state e⁄ects and the community e⁄ects
as additional controls.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the estimated propensity score for treatment and control groups
under four di⁄erent speci￿cations. In all speci￿cations, treatment and control groups have similar
propensity scores. There are su¢ ciently many untreated individuals to be used for matches for the
treatment group. Support condition and balancing assumption are also satis￿ed.
Table 6 reports the ATT of being informed about the GFC on giving as a percent of income and
weekly volunteering hours for alternative estimated propensity scores and matching estimators. If
people who are more charitably inclined are also more likely to hear about the GFC, then controlling
for the selection into being informed about the GFC should decrease the estimated e⁄ect of the GFC
on giving and volunteering patterns. As expected, controlling for the selection into being informed
about the GFC reduces the estimated impact of the campaign. In general, compared with the Tobit
models, the ATT of the GFC on giving as a percent of income is much smaller and insigni￿cant
under all alternative models. The e⁄ect of the GFC on weekly volunteering hours remains mostly
signi￿cant but again, it is mostly smaller than the estimates of the Tobit models. Under di⁄erent
models, the e⁄ect of the GFC on volunteering is always signi￿cant when the NFM, KM or RM with
di⁄erent calipers are employed. In model 4, the NM without replacement and in models 3 and 4,
21In order to estimate the propensity score for di⁄erent speci￿cations, I begin with a starting speci￿cation which
incorporates all observable covariates linearly and include some higher order and interaction terms when necessary to
ensure that balancing property is satis￿ed. I also conduct standard t-tests for equality of means in the treatment and
control groups, both before and after matching. These test and full estimates from the ￿rst stage probit models are
available upon request.
22For example, as of the campaign start date, the IS had 32 member charities in New York, but none in several states.
11the NM with replacement yields an insigni￿cant estimated e⁄ect of the GFC on weekly volunteering
hours. However, using Monte Carlo experiments, Fr￿lich (2004) shows that k-nearest neighborhood
matching estimators in general perform worse than Kernel estimators. Hence, my analysis relies on
the signi￿cant ATT coe¢ cients of the GFC. The estimated ATT coe¢ cients in model 1 imply that
people who heard about the GFC volunteered 21 to 27 minutes more per week compared with those
who did not hear about the campaign. Model 2, which controls for the state e⁄ects, yields slightly
higher estimated e⁄ect of the GFC on volunteering. This model suggests that people who were
informed about the GFC increased their weekly volunteering activity by around 24 to 34 minutes.
Model 3, which includes community e⁄ects as additional controls, yields relatively similar estimates
compared with model 1. The estimated ATT coe¢ cients in this model show that people who heard
about the GFC volunteered 22 to 27 minutes more per week. Model 4, which includes full set of
controls, yields the largest estimated e⁄ect of the GFC on volunteering. This model implies that
people who heard about the GFC volunteered by around 30 to 33 minutes more per week than those
who did not hear about the campaign. Hence, increase in individual weekly volunteering activity in
response to the GFC was considerable but in general, slightly less than the e⁄ect estimated by the
standard tobit models.
4.3 Selection on unobservables
The estimated e⁄ect of the GFC reported above depends on the assumption that observable char-
acteristics of individuals determine the selection into being informed about the campaign. If some
unobservable factors a⁄ect both charitable behavior and probability of being informed about the
GFC, then propensity score matching methods do not yield consistent estimates. In order to address
this possibility, I estimate several two-step endogenous Tobit models. In these models, following An-
grist (2001), I estimate a probit model of being informed about the GFC as a function of observable
characteristics in the ￿rst stage.23 Next, I calculate a Mills-ratio type endogeneity correction term
Ti(￿￿i=￿i) + (1 ￿ Ti)￿i=(1 ￿ ￿i), where Ti indicates the treatment status and ￿i and ￿i are normal
density and cumulative distribution functions evaluated at the probit ￿rst-stage ￿tted values. In the
second stage, I run standard Tobit models by including this correction term as an additional control
variable. The coe¢ cient of the correction term is ￿￿, where ￿ is the correlation between the latent
23The observable characteristics are the same as those reported in section 4.2 above.
12error determining treatment assignment and the outcome residual and ￿ is the standard deviation
of the outcome residual. If this coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, then sample selection
correction using the two-step endogenous Tobit model is needed.
The identi￿cation of this model requires either functional form assumptions or at least one instru-
mental variable that is correlated with the probability of being informed about the GFC but not with
unobservable determinants of giving or volunteering. I use the respondent￿ s con￿dence in media as an
instrument for being informed about the GFC.24 Although not reported, the ￿rst-stage probit esti-
mates show that this variable is a signi￿cant determinant of the probability of being informed about
the campaign. However, the coe¢ cient of the correction term is insigni￿cant in the second-stage
Tobit models.25 Similarly, using functional form assumptions that do not require any instrumental
variables, I ￿nd that the coe¢ cient of the correction term is insigni￿cant and hence, sample selection
correction due to selection on unobservables is not needed.26
4.4 The economic impact of the GFC
According to the most conservative estimate generated by the NFM estimator in model 1 above, the
GFC did not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on charitable giving patterns but those who heard about the
campaign increased their weekly volunteering activity by slightly over 20 minutes. Although this
e⁄ect seems to be small, the economic impact of an increase in volunteering activity by this amount
is considerable. The IS￿ s annual reports on volunteering contain information on the estimated dollar
value of volunteering time, which is based on the average hourly wage of all production and non-
supervisory workers on private nonfarm payrolls as reported by Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
average estimated dollar value of volunteering calculated by the IS from 1988 to 1996 was $13:5 in
1996 dollars. During the same period, on average 9 percent of the US adult population heard about
the GFC and among them 57 percent volunteered. Using the average US adult population during the
campaign period, I calculate that the value of the estimated increase in weekly volunteering activity
24This a binary variable which is equal to one if the respondent reported that she has a great deal or a lot of con￿dence
in media. This variable is not available for the 1988 wave of the survey.
25Here, I naturally assume that the functional form assumptions.for how the GFC and other observable characteristics
of the respondents a⁄ect giving and volunteering are correct and that the con￿dence in media is a valid instrument for
being informed about the GFC. If these assumptions fail, then the two-step procedure may yield inconsistent parameter
estimates.
26The usual standard errors from the two-step procedure is incorrect. I use the bootstrap with 500 replications to
calculate the correct standard errors. The results are available upon request.
13of those who heard about the campaign is slightly more than $48 million per week in 1996 dollars.27
Hence, although the GFC did not achieve its goal of making people to give ￿ve percent of their
income and volunteer ￿ve hours per week, the economic value of the extra charity created due to the
campaign was substantial.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the e⁄ect of a national fundraising campaign, which was advertised from
1987 to 1995 via mass media, on charitable giving and volunteering patterns. The main objective
of the GFC was to encourage people to give ￿ve percent of their income and volunteer ￿ve hours a
week. Since U.S. citizens donate on average two percent of their income and volunteer two hours per
week,28 the GFC was directly aimed at changing donor behavior by setting new standards for giving
and volunteering.
Using standard Tobit models, which do not control for selection into being informed about the
GFC, I ￿nd that people who heard about the GFC increased their giving as a percentage of their
household income by around 0:4 percentage points and their weekly volunteering hours by more than
half an hour. Moreover, for those who heard about the campaign, the e⁄ect of being informed about
the GFC from a particular media source on charitable giving is not sign￿cantly di⁄erent from the
e⁄ect of being informed about the GFC from any other media source.
However, the e⁄ect of the GFC on giving and volunteering is much smaller once selection into
being informed about the GFC is controlled for. Using propensity score matching methods and several
matching estimators, I ￿nd that the aggregate e⁄ect of the GFC on monetary giving patterns was
insigni￿cant during the campaign period. The e⁄ect of the GFC on volunteering remains signi￿cant,
however. After controlling for selection into being informed about the GFC, I ￿nd that people who
heard about the campaign increased their weekly volunteering activity on average by almost half an
hour. In general, this result is also robust to the choice of regression methods, matching estimators,
27The average US adult population druing the campaign period was 200,126,000. I calculate the economic impact of
the GFC as 200,126,000￿0.09￿0.57￿$13.5￿20.8/60=$48,047,051. For comparison purposes, IS reports that in 2001,
83.9 million Americans volunteered, representing the equivalent of 9 million full-time employees at a value of $239 billion.
28This numbers are consistent with the historical trends (Andreoni, 2006). The most recent estimates are slightly
higher. For example Giving USA (2007) reports that people on average donate three percent of their income to charitable
causes.
14and control variables. Although my ￿ndings imply that the GFC did not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
giving patterns, a rough estimate suggests that the dollar value of the increase in volunteering due
to the GFC was at least $48 million a week. Hence, although the GFC did not achieve its goal of
setting new standards for giving and volunteering, its economic impact was quite substantial.
Considering the economic impact of the GFC, my results reveal media as an e⁄ective tool to
inform potential donors and facilitate charitable behavior. Yet, some questions remain untouched,
primarily due to the limitations of the survey data. First, mass media advertising for the GFC was
more likely to in￿ uence people who regard charity as a non-monetary exchange.29 Why was the GFC
more e⁄ective in making people donate time rather than money? A possible reason is that mass media
campaigns are most likely to be heard by people who have low opportunity cost of time such as retired
or unemployed since these people spend most of their time watching TV or listening to radio. It is
not surprising that these people may want to respond charitable campaigns by volunteering rather
than donating money.
Second, to what extent do my results on the GFC generalize to other national fundraising cam-
paigns of the same nature? Given the lack of comparable studies on national fundraising campaigns,
this study should be viewed as a ￿rst step in understanding the e⁄ect of mass media on charitable
giving and volunteering. Future research can focus on how media would a⁄ect charitable behavior
under di⁄erent incentives or due to the alternative settings of fundraising campaigns. These questions
call for more detailed survey and experimental data on charitable giving and volunteering.
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Table 1. Definition of key variables and summary statistics 
 





Giving as a percent of income
Household’s total charitable contributions divided by the 
household’s income and multiplied by hundred.  1.758 2.053 1.719
(4.804) (4.386) (4.833)
Weekly volunteering hours
Total number of hours volunteered by the respondent per week. 
The data report monthly volunteering hours. I divide this amount 
by four to calculate weekly volunteering hours. 1.681 2.025 1.647
(4.073) (4.216) (4.050)
Main control variables
Informed about the GFC =1 if the respondent reported that she heard about the GFC. 0.092 - -
(0.290)
Household income
Total household income in 1996 dollars. Respondents reported 
income in one of 15 before-tax income ranges. I use the midpoint of 
the each range as the actual income measure. 42,528 44,832 42,331
(30,061) (30,661) (29,990)
Tax price
=1 minus marginal tax rate for itemizers and 1 nonitemizers. Tax 
rates are calculated from information on probable filing status, 
income, itemization status, and other key variables. 0.911 0.899 0.912
(0.112) (0.117) (0.112)
Age Age of the respondent. 44.384 40.054 44.797
(17.589) (15.545) (17.731)
Family size Number of people in the household including the respondent. 3.043 2.990 3.048
(1.521) (1.432) (1.531)
Female =1 if the respondent is female. 0.518 0.484 0.523
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)




  18Hispanic =1 if the respondent is Hispanic. 0.072 0.043 0.075
(0.258) (0.204) (0.263)
Married =1 if the respondent is married. 0.644 0.604 0.649
(0.479) (0.489) (0.477)
High school graduate 
=1 if the highest level of education obtained by the respondent is a 
high school degree. 0.322 0.238 0.331
(0.467) (0.426) (0.470)
Attended college
=1 if the respondent attended college but did not receive a four-
year degree. 0.167 0.223 0.162
(0.373) (0.416) (0.369)
College graduate =1 if the respondent obtained a four-year college or higher degree. 0.168 0.226 0.161
(0.374) (0.418) (0.368)
Employed =1 if the respondent is employed. 0.605 0.695 0.596
(0.489) (0.460) (0.491)
Regularly attends to religious services
=1 if the respondent reported attending religious services for every 
week or nearly every week. 0.441 0.404 0.445
(0.497) (0.491) (0.497)
Other control variables
Years lived in current community: 2 to 4
=1 if the respondent reported living in her current community 2 to 
4 years. 0.136 0.163 0.135
(0.343) (0.369) (0.341)
Years lived in current community: 5 to 9
=1 if the respondent reported living in her current community 5 to 
9 years. 0.150 0.158 0.149
(0.357) (0.365) (0.356)
Years lived in current community: 10+
=1 if the respondent reported living in her current community 
more than 10 years. 0.567 0.491 0.574
(0.495) (0.500) (0.494)





Notes: Sample weighted means are reported. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The maximum sample size is 12,401. The number of 
observations for each variable varies modestly due to non-respondents. The excluded category in education dummies is those who did not complete 
high school. The excluded category in community dummies is those who lived in their current community for less than two years.
  19Table 2. The relationship between giving and volunteering and the GFC 
 
Informed about the 
GFC
Uninformed about the 
GFC Difference
Full Sample
Giving as a percent of income 2.053 1.719 0.334
(0.143) (0.047) (0.155)
Weekly volunteering hours 2.025 1.647 0.378
(0.135) (0.038) (0.127)
Donor and/or volunteer
Giving as a percent of income 2.725 2.613 0.112
(0.182) (0.070) (0.213)




































  20Table 3. Giving as a percent of income and weekly volunteering hours: Tobit model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Informed about the GFC 0.230 0.209 0.238 0.215 0.452 0.440 0.464 0.450
(0.084)*** (0.084)** (0.084)*** (0.084)*** (0.109)*** (0.109)*** (0.109)*** (0.109)***
ln (Household income) - - - - 0.298 0.349 0.263 0.312
(0.053)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** (0.055)***
ln (Tax price) -1.361 -1.467 -1.305 -1.418 -0.999 -0.995 -0.913 -0.914
(0.190)*** (0.191)*** (0.195)*** (0.197)*** (0.266)*** (0.265)*** (0.269)*** (0.268)***
Age 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Family size 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.103 0.105 0.095 0.097
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)***
Female -0.068 -0.065 -0.069 -0.066 0.276 0.267 0.273 0.264
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.060)*** (0.059)*** (0.060)*** (0.059)***
Black -0.393 -0.367 -0.383 -0.360 -0.239 -0.137 -0.215 -0.121
(0.063)*** (0.066)*** (0.064)*** (0.066)*** (0.086)*** (0.091) (0.087)** (0.091)
Hispanic -0.343 -0.363 -0.330 -0.356 -0.458 -0.406 -0.437 -0.397
(0.067)*** (0.073)*** (0.067)*** (0.073)*** (0.088)*** (0.096)*** (0.089)*** (0.096)***
Married 0.194 0.188 0.193 0.190 0.162 0.123 0.154 0.123
(0.054)*** (0.053)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** (0.071)** (0.071)* (0.072)** (0.072)*
High school graduate  0.113 0.114 0.103 0.106 0.144 0.132 0.133 0.123
(0.064)* (0.064)* (0.064) (0.064) (0.087)* (0.086) (0.087) (0.086)
Attended college 0.452 0.438 0.444 0.429 0.696 0.653 0.692 0.650
(0.082)*** (0.082)*** (0.082)*** (0.082)*** (0.112)*** (0.111)*** (0.112)*** (0.111)***
College graduate 0.531 0.518 0.532 0.518 1.142 1.116 1.159 1.131
(0.079)*** (0.080)*** (0.080)*** (0.080)*** (0.113)*** (0.112)*** (0.114)*** (0.113)***
Employed 0.067 0.062 0.058 0.053 0.268 0.228 0.254 0.214
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.071)*** (0.070)*** (0.071)*** (0.070)***
Regularly attends to religious services 0.967 0.946 0.954 0.936 1.213 1.197 1.191 1.177
(0.047)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.064)***
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Community effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
ATT 0.403 0.365 0.415 0.373 0.494 0.496 0.512 0.510
(0.165)*** (0.161)** (0.165)*** (0.161)** (0.162)*** (0.167)*** (0.165)*** (0.168)***
σ 5.213 5.181 5.213 5.181 8.111 8.024 8.102 8.013
(0.048)*** (0.048)*** (0.048)*** (0.048)*** (0.110)*** (0.109)*** (0.110)*** (0.109)***
Log-likelihood -20597.50 -20542.79 -20560.48 -20506.19 -14127.83 -14048.76 -14090.60 -14011.61
Pseudo R
2 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.041 0.046 0.041 0.047
Number of censored obs. 2730 2730 2727 2727 5575 5575 5569 5569
Number of obs. 8851 8851 8838 8838 8851 8851 8838 8838
Giving as a percent of income Weekly volunteering hours
 
 
Notes: Marginal effects conditional on the outcome being uncensored are reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. All models include a constant term. The signs *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% 
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A.  Giving as a percent of income 
 
TV Radio Newspaper
Radio 1.50 - -
(0.221)
Newspaper 0.86 0.05 -
(0.353) (0.826)





B.  Weekly volunteering hours 
 
TV Radio Newspaper
Radio 0.78 - -
(0.377)
Newspaper 3.61 0.59 -
(0.057)* (0.443)





Notes: Data from survey years 1990, 1992, and 1994 are used. Two-sided chi-squared test statistics with 
one degree of freedom for the equality of the coefficients on binary control variables for alternative media 
sources across different tobit models are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. The null hypothesis 
is that for those who heard about the GFC, the effect of being informed about GFC from a particular 
media source is equal to the effect of being informed about the GFC from another media source. The sign 
















  22Table 5. The probability of being informed about the GFC: Probit model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (Household income) -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.113)
ln (Tax price) -0.079 -0.094 -0.085 -0.105
(0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
Age 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Family size -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.009
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.017)
Black -0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.036
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018)*
Hispanic -0.029 -0.020 -0.030 -0.020
(0.008)*** (0.009)** (0.009)*** (0.009)**
Married -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High school graduate  -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.018
(0.008)** (0.008)*** (0.008)** (0.008)**
Attended college 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
College graduate 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023
(0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)**
Employed -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Regularly attends to religious services 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects No Yes No Yes
Community effects No No Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -2542.84 -2466.42 -2534.79 -2455.75
Pseudo R
2 0.024 0.052 0.025 0.055
Number of obs. 8851 8823 8838 8810  
 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a constant 
term. All models also include higher order and/or interaction terms in order to satisfy the balancing 
property. The signs *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. 
  23Table 6. Propensity score matching estimates 
 
NM without 
replacement      
(low-to-high)
NM with 
replacement NFM RM           
(caliper = 0.005)
RM           
(caliper = 0.001) KM
Model 1
Number of treated obs. 765 765 765 765 763 765
Number of untreated obs. 765 711 2416 8078 7996 8083
ATT (Giving) 0.180 0.229 0.118 0.157 0.162 0.160
(0.214) (0.219) (0.186) (0.155) (0.155) (0.145)
ATT (Volunteering) 0.393 0.424 0.347 0.434 0.445 0.435
(0.239)* (0.262)* (0.211)* (0.182)** (0.190)** (0.183)**
Model 2
Number of treated obs. 765 765 765 760 747 765
Number of untreated obs. 765 702 2374 8035 7896 8056
ATT (Giving) 0.154 0.163 0.246 0.202 0.260 0.214
(0.219) (0.249) (0.202) (0.162) (0.168) (0.159)
ATT (Volunteering) 0.392 0.438 0.560 0.500 0.498 0.503
(0.233)* (0.262)* (0.231)** (0.188)*** (0.188)*** (0.193)***
Model 3
Number of treated obs. 764 764 764 764 763 764
Number of untreated obs. 764 708 2427 8067 7981 8072
ATT (Giving) 0.113 0.074 0.117 0.172 0.186 0.172
(0.225) (0.259) (0.193) (0.151) (0.151) (0.148)
ATT (Volunteering) 0.376 0.303 0.461 0.466 0.473 0.459
(0.228)* (0.241) (0.217)** (0.173)*** (0.173)*** (0.182)**
Model 4
Number of treated obs. 764 764 764 762 748 764
Number of untreated obs. 764 688 2316 8007 7797 8046
ATT (Giving) 0.182 0.171 0.167 0.216 0.203 0.219
(0.221) (0.303) (0.234) (0.162) (0.173) (0.155)
ATT (Volunteering) 0.322 0.344 0.498 0.525 0.543 0.494
(0.241) (0.244) (0.215)** (0.196)*** (0.187)*** (0.184)***
 
 
Notes: Standard errors calculated via 500 bootstrap replications are in parentheses. The signs *, **, and 
*** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. In estimating the propensity score, Model 1 
controls for household income, tax price of giving, age, family size, gender, educational attainment, race, 
ethnicity, employment and marital status, regular attendance to religious services, and year effects. Model 
2 adds state effects. Model 3 excludes state effects but includes community effects. Model 4 adds both 
state and community effects as additional controls. 
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Figure 1. The effect of the GFC on charitable giving and volunteering 
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Notes: Sample sizes differ between 8810 and 8851 due to missing information for some control 
variables. Model 1 controls for household income, tax price of giving, age, family size, gender, 
educational attainment, race, ethnicity, employment and marital status, regular attendance at 
religious services, and year effects. Model 2 includes state effects as additional controls. Model 3 
includes community effects as additional controls but excludes state effects. Model 4 includes both 
state effects and community effects as additional controls.  
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